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HALF AN ANSWER TO PLACING EMPLOYMENT TAXES
WITHIN THE PRIORITY STRUCTURE OF SECTION 64(a)
OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT-OTTE V. UNITED STATES
Codification of bankruptcy principles originated as an alternative to
"grab law," the chaotic practice whereby the most aggressive creditors
sliced up a debtor's assets.' Today the struggle among unsecured credi-
tors for the assets of a bankrupt estate is resolved through a system of
priorities established by the Bankruptcy Act.' Section 64(a) of the Act
sets forth five categories of claims which are entitled to priority before
distributions are made to general creditors.' Only when a creditor estab-
1. At common law a person's property could be taken as satisfaction of a debt. This
was done on a "first come, first served" basis; a creditor making the first seizure by
execution or attachment took preference over another creditor perfecting a subsequent
levy. 9 AM. .Jun. 2d Bankruptcy §1 (1963). Insolvency and bankruptcy laws originated in
Roman law and have been enforced in England for more than three centuries. See Conti-
nental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648 (1935). The
Federal Constitution grants Congress power to enact bankruptcy legislation. U.S. CONST.
art. 1, §8, cl. 4. Congress first exercised this power in 1800 when the first American
Bankruptcy Act was passed. However, this Act was repealed in 1803 and the second
Bankruptcy Act was not enacted until 1841. This Act was repealed in 1843. Again there
was a period when no federal Bankruptcy Act was in force until the Bankruptcy Act of
1867. The 1867 Act was repealed in 1878 and another Act was not enacted until 1898 when
the Act currently in force was passed. See Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181
(1902)..See generally C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY HISTORY IN THE UNITED STATES (1935).
2. Bankruptcy Act §64(a), 11 U.S.C. §104a (1970) [hereinafter cited by reference to the
more commonly used Bankruptcy Act section numbersj.
3. Not all creditors are treated equally in the distribution of the assets of a bankrupt
estate. Secured creditors are generally paid before distribution of assets is made to the
unsecured creditors. An unsecured creditor who has a right to priority, that is, one who
falls within one of the classes of debts established by the priority structure of section 64(a),
is entitled to payment before other claims in distribution of the remaining assets. See 3A
W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 64.02[1] (14th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
COLIERI. Section 64(a) sets forth the following classes of debts in order of payment, which
are summarized as follows:
(1) Costs and expenses of administration of the bankrupt's estate, including
trustee's and attorney's fees.
(2) Wage claims, not to exceed $600, to each claimant, earned within three
months before the date of commencement of the proceeding by certain employ-
ees.
(3) Costs and expenses incurred by creditors in opposing an arrangement,
Chapter XIII plan or a discharge; and expenses in adducing evidence resulting
in conviction under Chapter IX of Title 18.
(4) Taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States or any
state or political subdivision.
(5) Debts other than taxes owing to any person, including the United States,
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lishes that his claim falls within one of these categories is it entitled to
priority status.' Claims by certain employees5 for wages earned prior to
the bankruptcy proceeding are accorded second priority. However, a
serious problem has plagued the courts for over 25 years.' Is the bank-
rupt estate liable for payment of employment taxes arising out of these
wage claims? If so, what priority, if any, should be given to these em-
ployment tax claims of the federal government under the Bankruptcy
Act?
In attempting to reconcile the opposing objectives of tax collection
and the equitable administration of bankrupt estates,7 most courts have
failed to recognize that there are actually two different types of
employment taxes: (1) withholding taxes deducted from an employee's
gross pay' and (2) employer taxes imposed only upon the employer.' To
who by the laws of the United States is entitled to priority; and rent owing to a
landlord for use and occupancy of premises within three months prior to bank-
ruptcy.
All claims within each class must be paid in full before distribution is made to the next
lower priority. If funds are insufficient to pay a priority class in full, all claims within a
class generally share pro rata in whatever payment is made. However, under section 64(a),
where bankruptcy follows a debtor relief proceeding, administrative costs and expenses
incurred in the bankruptcy proceeding are accorded a subpriority ahead of prior unpaid
costs and expenses. See also discussion of fifth priority in note 15 infra.
4. "Where priorities under Section 64 are in issue, a strict construction must be placed
thereon and the burden falls upon those asserting a priority to establish that they come
within the intended class." 3A COLLIER 64.02[6]. See also In re Paradise Catering Corp.,
36 F. Supp. 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
5. Only wages and commissions due to "workmen, servants, clerks, or traveling or city
salesmen," are allowed second priority status. The theory is that it is only these employees
who need protection in the event of their employer's bankruptcy, since they probably do
not know the credit standing of their employer nor maintain adequate financial reserves
to meet such a contingency. See Bankruptcy Act §64(a)(2); In re Lawsam Elec. Co., 300
F. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); In re Estey, 6 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). In today's economy,
a "professional" is as much in need of the protections afforded under this section as is a
"salesman," indicating that section 64(a)(2) is in need of revision. Plumb, The Tax Rec-
ommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws - Priority and Dischargea-
bility of Tax Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 991, 1023 (1974).
6. The first decision to consider both the question of withholding and employer taxes
on second priority wage claims was United States v. Fogarty, 164 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1947).
7. See Flanagan, The Determination and Payment of Federal Taxes in Bankruptcy, 47
AM. BANKR. L.J. 81 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Flanagan]. This article points out that
while equitable distribution of assets is one of the goals of the Bankruptcy Act, this is
definitely not the objective of the tax collector, whose responsibility is to enforce federal
tax laws.
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §3102, requires social security tax to be deducted from the
employee's wages by the employer. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §3402, requires the employer
to deduct federal income tax from wages paid.
9. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §3111, requires the employer to pay an excise tax commonly
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clarify this distinction, assume an employer pays an employee a salary
of $100. The employer must deduct 5.85%"J or $5.85 for payment of the
employee's portion of the social security tax and also withhold approxi-
mately 20%" or $20.00 for federal income tax purposes. The employee
thus receives a check for $74.15. The $25.85 balance of the $100 gross
salary constitutes withholding taxes. However, the employer's tax re-
sponsibility does not end when he withholds these taxes from the em-
ployee's gross pay. The employer must match dollar for dollar the social
security tax withheld from the employee by paying 5.85%12 or $5.85 to
the federal government as an expense of the company. In addition, the
employer must pay another tax of 3.2% or $3.20 for unemployment tax
purposes." Thus every time the employer pays his employee $100, the
employer must pay out of his own pocket an additional $9.05 in em-
ployer taxes, so that the employer's total cost is $109.05 on a salary
payment of $100.
Failure to recognize the distinction between withholding and
employer taxes is perhaps a major reason for a split in the circuit court
decisions," with different circuits placing employment taxes in either
called employer's contribution to social security tax. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §3301,
imposes a federal unemployment excise tax on the employer.
10. Treas. Reg. §31.3101-2 (1976). A tax at the rate of 5.85% is presently imposed on
amounts paid to employees up to a maximum of $15,300 (1976 wage base) per employee
per year.
11. Employers are responsible for collecting the correct amount of income tax from wage
payments. There are two conventional methods used, wage-bracket method and percen-
tage method, both of which consider the number of exemptions an employee claims and
total income earned. For purposes of simplification, this example uses a 20% withholding,
although the actual percentage would vary from case to case. In bankruptcy, the Internal
Revenue Service directives allow a trustee the option of using the exact calculation
method or using a flat 25cc withholding combining the employee portion of FICA tax and
federal income tax. See Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43, 47 n.2 (1974); Flanagan, supra
note 7, at 91.
12. Treas. Reg. §31.3111-2 (1976). A tax at the rate of 5.85% is presently imposed on
the employer up to a maximum of $15,300 (wage base for 1976) paid to each employee
per year.
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §3301. The tax is equal to 3.2% of wages paid by the
employer up to a maximum of $4,200 per year. However, a credit of up to 2.7% may be
obtained by employers who are subject to state unemployment tax laws. See INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §3302. As to relative rights of federal and state governments, see United
States v. New York, 315 U.S. 510 (1942).
14. Characteristic of the difficulties courts have had in segregating withholding taxes
from employer taxes is the statement of the Supreme Court in Otte v. United States:
"ITIhe circuits are in disarray as to the priority to be accorded to withholding taxes on
prebankruptcy wage claims." 419 U.S. 43, 47 (1974). The Court then cited the case of
Lines v. California Dep't of Employment, 242 F.2d 201, aff'd on rehearing, 246 F.2d 70
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the first, second or fourth priority." After 25 years of conflicting federal
court decisions, in Otte v. United States" the United States Supreme
Court held that (1) claims for wages earned by employees before an
employer's bankruptcy, but unpaid at the inception of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, are subject to withholding taxes, 7 and (2) withholding taxes
are entitled to second priority since they are "carved out" of the wages
themselves."6 Unfortunately, the liability of the bankrupt estate for
employer taxes was not in issue in Otte and therefore remains the sub-
ject of dispute.'6
This Note will examine the rationale used in Otte to accord with-
holding taxes a second priority status and will then analyze the unre-
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 857 (1957), as one of the circuit court decisions split on
the issue of withholding taxes. The Lines decision dealt solely with employer taxes. An-
other example of this problem is the decision in United States v. Fogarty, 164 F.2d 26 (8th
Cir. 1947), which dealt with both withholding and employer taxes, but failed to distin-
guish between the employee and employer portions of social security tax, treating both
portions as if they were one type of tax. See also note 50 infra.
15. The circuit courts are split between the following priorities on the issue of withhold-
ing taxes: United States v. Fogarty, 164 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1947) (first priority); In re
Freedomland, Inc., 480 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1973) (second priority); In re Connecticut Motor
Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1964) (fourth priority). "The third and fifth priorities
clearly have no possible application to these taxes." Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43,
56 (1974). Tax claims obviously do not fall within the scope of third priority claims. See
note 3 supra. Fifth priority is given to "debts other than taxes owing to any person,
including the United States, who by the laws of the United States is entitled to priority."
Bankruptcy Act §64(a). The only law of the United States granting priority to "any
person" is 31 U.S.C. §§191, 193 (1970), which grants priority only to the United States
and sureties on bonds given to the United States by their principals. The words "other
than for taxes" were inserted into fifth priority by an amendment in 1966 to prevent the
apparent overlap between fourth and fifth priorities. Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
495, §2, 80 Stat. 268. In addition, the fourth priority section was amended in 1966 to
include the following new language: "no priority over general unsecured claims shall
pertain to taxes not included in the foregoing priority." Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-496, §3, 80 Stat. 271. Thus taxes falling within fourth priority are not classified as debts
owed the United States under section 64(a)(5) by means of the federal priority statute.
The view that tax claims should have fifth priority as a non-tax debt owed to the United
States by a collection agent has long been rejected by the courts. See United States v.
New York, 315 U.S. 510, 513-16 (1942). See also 3A COLLIER 64.404[2.21.
16. 419 U.S. 43 (1974).
17. Id. at 48-51.
18. Id. at 58.
19. This author has not been able to ascertain why the United States did not advance
the argument that employer taxes were also to be paid on the wage claims in this case. In
other cases, the United States government has asserted that employer taxes are to be paid
as a first priority claim. See, e.g., United States v. Fogarty, 164 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1947);
In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1964). See also text accompany-
ing note 42 infra.
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solved question of employer taxes in light of the Otte decision. Courts
are forced to base their decisions on an antiquated priority structure
contained in the present Bankruptcy Act. This has resulted in confusion
and conflicts in court decisions. Congressional modification of the prior-
ity structure can best resolve the problem of employment taxes on pre-
bankruptcy wage claims.2"
THE RATIONALE OF OTTE
Background of the Case
Freedomland, Inc. operated an amusement park located in Bronx
County, New York. On September 15, 1964, Freedomland filed a peti-
tion for an arrangement with its unsecured creditors under Chapter XI
of the Bankruptcy Act." The rehabilitation effort failed, and 11 months
later Freedomland was adjudicated a bankrupt. Former employees of
Freedomland who had performed services for the company prior to its
Chapter XI petition filed 413 wage claims, each for $600.00 or less,
totalling approximately $80,000. William Otte, the trustee for the bank-
rupt Freedomland, requested relief from withholding and filing returns
for income and social security taxes on these second priority wage
claims. The bankruptcy judge granted the trustee's request, ordering
the wage claims to be paid without imposition of the withholding tax
liability." The United States and the city of New York" filed a petition
for review and obtained a district court reversal24 of the bankruptcy
judge's order. The district court directed the trustee to withhold income
and social security taxes from the wage claims and held that such taxes
were to be allowed fourth priority status under section 64(a). On
appeal,2" the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that with-
20. "Prebankruptcy wage claims" refers to wage claims by former employees for wages
earned prior to the initiation of the bankruptcy proceedings, but paid after bankruptcy
by the estate. The terms "prebankruptcy wage claims" and "second priority wage claims"
will be used interchangeably through this Note.
21. 11 U.S.C. §§701-99 (1970).
22. In re Freedomland, Inc., No. 64 B 727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 1971).
23. New York City requires employers to withhold a tax from wages paid to employees.
NEw YORK CITY. N.Y. ADM. CoDE §T46-51.0 (residents) and §U46-12.0 (non-residents)
(1971). The rate of this tax is set forth at sections T46-3.0 and U46-2.0. However, in the
principal case, the rate of tax was agreed upon as 1%. See In re Freedomland, Inc., 480
F.2d 184, 187 n.3 (2d Cir. 1973). This tax is conceptually the same as the withholding of
the federal income tax and will not be dealt with in this Note. It is to be noted, however,
that in ()tte, the United States government argued that withholding taxes should be
entitled to first priority, while the city of New York advanced a second priority theory.
24. In re Freedomland, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
25. In re Freedomland, Inc., 480 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1973).
[Vol. 25:756
OTTE v. UNITED STATES
holding taxes must be paid, but ruled that these taxes were entitled to
second priority status. The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari"5 (1) to review whether withholding taxes should be paid on pre-
bankruptcy wages and (2) to resolve the split in the circuit courts as to
which priority should be accorded these taxes under section 64(a).
Withholding Taxes Must Be Paid on Prebankruptcy Wage Claims
Every court of appeals, including the circuit court in In re
Freedomland, which had faced the question of whether withholding
taxes must be deducted from second priority wage claims had required
the trustee to withhold these taxes." These decisions were severely criti-
cized by bankruptcy judges who contended that wage claims were hot
wages but dividends, and thus there was no liability whatsoever for
withholding taxes. The bankruptcy judges also argued that the trustee
was not an employer, since the wage claimant did not perform services
for the trustee and was not under the trustee's direction or control."8 The
bankruptcy judges were not alone in their opinion, for even the Second
Circuit in In re Freedomland had noted that on these issues they were
not writing on a "clean slate."" Therefore, before deciding whether
withholding taxes were entitled to a priority under the Bankruptcy Act,
26. 414 U.S. 1156 (1974).
27. See In re Freedomland, Inc., 480 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1973); In re Connecticut Motor
Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1964); United States v. Curtis, 178 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1949)
(decision did not reach the priority issue, but did conclude that the trustee had the duty
to withhold taxes on second priority wage claims); United States v. Fogarty, 164 F.2d 26
(8th Cir. 1947).
28. See Hiller, The Folly of the Fogarty Case, 34 REF. J. 54 (1958); Oglebay, Some
Developments in Bankruptcy Law, 23 REF. J. 12, 15 (1948); Oglebay, Some Developments
in Bankruptcy Law, 22 REF. J. 82, 84 (1948). See also Bankruptcy Act §65, which provides
the process for payment of claims and specifically defines these distributions as dividends.
The opinion of the bankruptcy judges on this matter has not changed over the years. See,
e.g., In re Erie Forge & Steel Corp., No. 69-83 (W.D. Pa., Dec. 29, 1962) (unreported
decision concluding that withholding taxes need not be deducted at all from wage claim
distributions); In re Freedomland, Inc., No. 64 B 727 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 27, 1971).
29. In Freedomland, the court held that income and social security taxes should be
withheld, finding themselves bound by precedent. However, the court noted that merit
might be found in arguments to the contrary if the issue were faced afresh. In re Freedom-
land, Inc., 480 F.2d 184, 187-88 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Jenkins, Leading Case Commen-
tary, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87, 96 (1974), where Bankruptcy Judge Jenkins' commentary on
the Second Circuit's decision in Freedomland concludes:
The finding of an absolute duty to withhold and report in all cases great and
small does not make sense. . ..
The clean slate is available. The Supreme Court needs but to write on it.
1976]
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the Supreme Court dealt with the issues of whether prebankruptcy wage
claims were wages or dividends and whether an employer was present.
The Court found that payment of wage claims as dividends in the
distribution of assets of the bankrupt estate did not cause these pay-
ments to lose their identity as wages. The payment of wage claims was
payment for services performed by employees prior to bankruptcy and
thus fell within the broad definition of wages under the Internal Reve-
nue Code. :"'
The Court then had to determine whether an employer with the re-
sponsibility of complying with the applicable withholding and reporting
provisions of federal law was present. Since withholding taxes include
both social security taxes and federal income taxes, the Court looked to
the social security and federal income tax withholding provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code to find a definition of employer. Although the
social security provisions do not define employer,3 the Court was not
disturbed by this point for employer is defined for federal income tax
withholding purposes.2 Without further inquiry the Court simply stated
that the definition of employer is not to be construed more narrowly for
social security withholding taxes than for federal income tax withhold-
ing. 33
30. The term "wages" is defined in both the federal income tax withholding and social
security (FICA) tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§3401(a) states: "Wages. For the purpose of this chapter [income tax withholding], the
term 'wages' means all remuneration . . . for services performed by an employee for his
employer .. " TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §3121 states: "Wages. For purposes of this
chapter IFICA], the term 'wages' means all remuneration for employment .... "
31. The FICA provisions of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §3121(h) states: "American
employer. For purposes of this chapter [FICAj, the term 'American employer' means an
employer .... " This is obviously a circular "non-definition."
:32. [NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §3401(d) states:
Employer. For purposes of this chapter, [income tax withholding] the term
"employer" means the person for whom an individual performs or performed
any service, of whatever nature, as the employee of such person, except that -
(1) if the person for whom the individual performs or performed the
services does not have control of the payment of the wages for such
services, the term 'employer' . . . means the person having control of
the payment of such wages . ...
33. The Court did not cite any authority for its decision. Previously, the FICA and
income tax provisions of the Code were considered to be distinct and were not interpreted
together. Otte has been cited as authority for the proposition that they now should be so
interpreted. See United States v. Callahan, [1975-76 Transfer Binderl CCH UNEMPL. INS.
REP. 11 14,265 (N.D. Tex. 1975), where a determination by the government that a person
is an employer for income tax withholding purposes under the Internal Revenue Code
precluded it from successfully asserting that the person is not an employer for FICA tax
purposes.
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The federal income tax withholding provisions define employer as the
person for whom services are performed. The definition further provides
that if the party for whom the services are performed 4 does not have
control of the payment of wages, then employer refers to the one who
has "control of the payment of such wages." The Court thus established
that the responsibility for withholding taxes is on the one "at the point
of control. '" In the instant case, the Court found an employer was
present, but found it unnecessary to determine whether it was the trus-
tee, the referee, the bankrupt estate, or the bankruptcy court who pos-
sessed the requisite control to qualify as the employer. It was sufficient
that one of these parties possessed "control over payment of such wages"
and was thus an employer with the duty to withhold or to order with-
holding of income and social security taxes.
The Court thus settled a long-standing debate between the federal
courts and the bankruptcy judges by concluding that withholding taxes
must be withheld from second priority wage claims. The Supreme Court
was then faced with the problem of resolving the split in the circuit court
decisions over which priority, if any, withholding taxes should be al-
lowed under section 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act.
The Priority Issue in Otte
Federal court decisions prior to Otte had distinguished between taxes
on wage claims against the bankrupt accruing prior to bankruptcy and
taxes on wage claims arising after the filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy. If an employer were short of money prior to filing a petition in
bankruptcy, he might pay his employees their net wages or "take home
pay" and neglect to remit to the government the taxes supposedly with-
held from these payments. Courts held that the government's claim for
34. See note 32 supra.
35. 419 U.S. at 50.
36. Control of payment of wage claims can be exercised in various forms by different
parties in bankruptcy. The Supreme Court pointed out that the trustee, who has responsi-
bilities under sections 47(a)(8) and 47(a)(11) of the Bankruptcy Act for making recom-
mendations, could exercise control over the payment of wages. Section 47(a)(8) states that
the trustee is to "examine all proofs of claim and object to the allowance of such claims
as may be improper" and section 47(a)(11) provides that the trustee shall "pay dividends
within ten days after they are declared by the referees.". However, the bankruptcy judge
could also have control by his supervision over the general administration of the bankrupt
estate. The estate itself also may have an amount of control. Finally, the Court noted that
there was no provision excepting a court from the requirement of withholding on amounts
paid to an employee. 419 U.S. at 51 n.6, citing United States v. Fogarty, 164 F.2d 26, 32
(8th Cir. 1947).
1976]
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these taxes was entitled to fourth priority status, since these taxes were
"legally due and owing by the bankrupt."" On the other hand, people
were often hired by the trustee to perform services for the bankrupt
estate after the petition in bankruptcy had been filed. Taxes on wages
paid to these persons were held to be entitled to first priority as a cost
and expense of administration."' The critical point in time for determin-
ing the priority status of withholding taxes on wages is therefore the date
of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. Taxes on wages earned and
paid prior to this date are entitled to fourth priority while taxes on wages
earned and paid after this date are entitled to first priority. Confusion
thus resulted from the hybrid situation present in Otte of wages earned
prior, but paid after. the instigation of the bankruptcy proceeding.
In resolving the conflict among the circuit courts as to the priority to
be accorded withholding taxes, the Supreme Court rejected first prior-
ity."' The Court refused to accept the concept that, merely because
withholding taxes arose after bankruptcy, these taxes should automati-
cally be entitled to first priority. In the Court's opinion, withholding
taxes did not constitute "costs or expenses of doing business"4 ° and thus
did not fall within the language defining first priority claims. Further-
more, the Court noted that liability for withholding taxes can accrue
only when wages are actually paid.4 Since wage claims are second prior-
ity claims under section 64(a), the Court reasoned that it would be
anomalous to accord withholding taxes a higher priority than the wage
claims from which they were derived. To give such taxes first priority
37. In re John Home Co., 220 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1955); Pomper v. United States, 196
F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1952).
38. Missouri v. Gleick, 135 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1943); In re Lambertville Rubber Co., 111
F.2d 45 (3d Cir. 1940); United States v. Killoren, 119 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1941). If a debtor
in possession under Chapter XI withholds income and social security taxes from wages of
employees, but fails to pay this amount over to the United States, the government has
the authority under the INT. REv. COnE OF 1954, §7501(a), to claim these taxes as a secured
debt on a trust fund theory. If an identifiable trust fund can be established by reference
to conventional trust fund doctrines of tracing and identification, creditors in bankruptcy
will have no claim to the property held in trust. See 3A COLLIER 64.02[3]. The Supreme
Court has rejected this argument. See United States v. Randall, 401 U.S. 513 (1971); c.f
Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678 (1966). In Otte, the Court noted that the United
States could not claim trust fund status because the trustee had paid the wage claims and
set aside withholding tax pursuant to an agreement that the rights of the parties would
not be affected. 419 U.S. at 55 n.ll.
39. 419 U.S. at 56-57. For a discussion of the government's first priority argument see
generally Flanagan, supra note 7, at 81.
40. 419 U.S. at 57.
41. Id. See also Treas. Reg. §31.3402(a)-l(b)(1976) (income tax withholding) and Treas.
Reg. §31.3111-3 (1976) (social security).
[Vol. 25:756
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status would mean that the taxes would be paid before the duty to pay
ever arose.
The Court also rejected fourth priority,42 taxes "legally due and owing
by the bankrupt."43 Withholding taxes do not become due and owing
until the actual payment of wages, because calculation of withholding
taxes is based upon a percentage of wages actually paid and liability
does not attach until wages are paid." Since Freedomland never paid
the wages, taxes on these wages could never be due and owing by the
bankrupt.
Having excluded both first and fourth priorities, the Court concluded
that withholding taxes were entitled to second priority,45 as a deduction
from gross wages. Consequently, as in the case of a monthly pay check,"6
the wage claimant would actually receive a net amount as salary and
constructively receive the withheld amount which is paid to the govern-
ment against the wage claimant's ultimate income tax liability.,7 Thus
the wage claimants would not have the added burden of trying to pay
and obtain proper credit for income and social security taxes when filing
their individual tax returns.
The Court's rationale accorded withholding taxes a place within the
priority structure that is consistent with both the federal tax laws and
the Bankruptcy Act. This decision is compatible with the provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code since liability for such taxes can accrue only
upon actual payment of wages. 8 Since the second priority wage claims
were for gross wages containing within them the taxes to be withheld,
proper notice would be provided to other creditors of the exact amount
to be paid. This notice preserves the equitable principles underlying the
Bankruptcy Act.49
42. 419 U.S. at 56.
43. Bankruptcy Act §64(a)(4).
44. A tax is legally due and owing when all facts necessary for its calculation are known.
See In re Ingersoll Co., 148 F.2d 282 (10th Cir. 1945); In re International Match Corp., 79
F.2d 203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Delaware v. Irving Trust Co., 296 U.S. 652 (1935).
45. 419 U.S. at 58.
46. See notes 11-19 and accompanying text supra.
47. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6401(b). If amounts withheld are excessive the employee
can claim credit on his tax return and receive a refund.
48. See note 41 supra.
49. The fundamental purpose of requiring notice in bankruptcy proceedings is to give
each creditor an equal opportunity to avail himself of the benefit of the Bankruptcy Act.
In re DeSoto Crude Oil Purchasing Corp., 35 F. Supp. 1, 7 (W.D. La. 1940). See also
Bankruptcy Act §§7, 55.
1976]
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THE UNRESOLVED QUESTION: EMPLOYER TAXES
The decision in Otte resolved only part of the problem of employment
taxes on second priority wage claims. The issue of employer taxes paid
solely by the employer, such as federal unemployment taxes and the
employer portion of social security taxes, was not before the Court in
Otte. While lower federal courts have attempted to deal with the ques-
tion of employer taxes, little attention has been paid to the distinction
between withholding taxes and employer taxes. Moreover, these lower
court decisions have frequently been unclear.' The question of employer
taxes is likely to continue to plague the federal courts, since the federal
tax collector, in his quest for revenue, undoubtedly will continue to
pursue claims for employer taxes on prebankruptcy wage claims. There-
fore, it is important to give employer taxes a fresh analysis. The Su-
preme Court's approach to the problem of withholding taxes in Otte
may also be used to examine employer taxes. The unresolved questions
to be answered are (1) whether employer taxes must be paid by the
estate, and if so, then (2) what priority, if any, these taxes are to be
allowed under section 64(a).
Should Employer Taxes Be Paid on Prebankruptcy Wages?
As the Supreme Court noted in Otte, wage claims do not lose their
character as wages merely because they are paid as part of the distribu-
tion of a bankrupt estate." Under the Internal Revenue Code, the defini-
tion of wages for employer tax purposes is essentially the same as the
definition of wages for withholding tax purposes mentioned in Otte."2 In
50. In In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1963), the court
allowed the government's claim for both withholding and employer taxes, yet ordered the
trustee to withhold income and social security taxes from the wage claimant's distribu-
tions as a first priority matter. The court made no mention of the employer's excise tax.
The confusion surrounding the district court's decision was pointed out by the court of
appeals in In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96, 98 n.4 (3d Cir. 1964). See
also cases cited in note 14 supra. But see Armadillo Corp. v. United States, BNA DAILY
TAX REPOxr, No. 59, Mar. 25, 1976, at H-i, and In re Miller Ready Mix Koncrete
Corp., 348 F. Supp. 401 (D. Utah 1972), which recognized the distinction between
employee and employer taxes. Nevertheless, most of Miller is devoted to a discussion
for according withholding taxes priority status, and the analysis for employer taxes is
rather weak. See note 55 and accompanying text infra.
51. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
52. The definition includes "all remuneration," with certain exceptions not applicable
to the question of employment taxes in bankruptcy. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §3401(a)
(income tax withholding), §3121 (social security taxes), and §3306(b) (unemployment
taxes) which define the term "wages."
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addition, as in the case of withholding taxes, the liability for employer
taxes attaches only when wages are actually paid by an employer.53
Therefore, it must first be determined whether the trustee has the res-
ponsibilities of an employer pursuant to the definition of employer es-
tablished by the federal unemployment and social security taxing provi-
sions.
The Federal Unemployment Act was amended in 1970 to significantly
broaden the meaning of employer.54 Under the Act, an individual is an
employer if (1) on each of some twenty days during the current or pre-
ceding calendar year he employs at least one individual for some portion
of the day, or (2) he pays wages of $1,500 or more during any calendar
quarter in the current or preceding calendar year.55 Since this definition
has two alternative tests, the fact that the trustee would not have ac-
tually employed the wage claimants and would not meet the require-
ments of the first test is not important. The trustee would qualify as the
employer under the second test if he pays wage claims which total $1,500
in the aggregate. Thus there would be an employer present under the
Federal Unemployment Act and the bankruptcy trustee would be liable
for payment of federal unemployment taxes on second priority wage
claims.
Determining if the trustee would qualify as an employer under the
Social Security Act is a more difficult task, since the Act does not
provide a definition of employer. 6 The social security excise tax is im-
posed on the employer "with respect to having individuals in his em-
ploy."'5 ' The trustee would not employ the wage claimants; rather, this
employer-employee relationship would exist between the bankrupt and
the wage claimants. However, it is significant that the relationship of
employer and employee need not exist at the time wages are paid in
order for social security taxes to be imposed. 5 Thus if a former employer
makes a payment of wages to his former employees, he is liable for taxes
on those payments of wages, even though he is no longer an employer.
53. Treas. Reg. §31.3111-3 (1976) (social security) and Treas. Reg. §31.3301-4 (1976)
(unemployment taxes).
54. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §3306(a) (1970), amending INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §3306
(a).
55. From 1956-69 a person was an employer if on each of some twenty days during the
taxable year, each day being in a different calendar week, he employed for some portion
of a day four or more individuals. The trustee would not have been an employer under
this prior definition. For history of the amendments to this section, see 1A CCH UNEMPL.
INS. REP. 20,110-11.
56. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
57. Treas. Reg. §31.3111-4 (1976).
58. Treas. Reg. §31.3121(a)-1(i) (1976).
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It is in this context that the Third and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal
have reasoned that in paying wage claims the "trustee stands in the
shoes of the employer-bankrupt and should be equally subject to these
taxes as the employer."" In the alternative, one could also take the
approach of the Supreme Court in Otte and merely state that the fact
that the Social Security Act does not define employer is insignificant,
for employer is not to be construed more narrowly for social security tax
purposes than for unemployment tax purposes." Thus it could be con-
cluded that the trustee is an employer even under the non-definition of
employer found in the Social Security Act.
What Priority, If Any, Should Employer Taxes Be Allowed?
Lower federal courts dealing with the priority issue for employer taxes
on second priority wage claims have allowed these taxes either first
priority or fourth priority status.'" No federal court has held that em-
ployer taxes are entitled to second priority in the payment scale under
section 64(a); however, -this priority will be considered to determine
whether employer taxes, like the withholding taxes in Otte, may be
given second priority.
Courts according employer taxes a first priority status as costs of
administration have reasoned that employer taxes, unlike withholding
taxes, are not part of the wage claim itself, but a tax on the act of
distributing the assets of the estate.2 However, employer taxes do not
arise due to the distribution of assets, but because of the payment of
wage claims." Employer taxes cannot be paid ahead of the second
priority wage claims, by analogy to the rationale used in the Otte deci-
sion. The computation base for employer taxes is the same as withhold-
59. United States v. Fogarty, 164 F.2d 26, 30 (8th Cir. 1947). See also In re Connecticut
Motor Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96, 106 (3d Cir. 1964); Lines v. California Dep't of Employ-
ment, 242 F.2d 201 (9th Cir. 1957). Although the Third and Eighth Circuits agreed
that the trustee steps into the shoes of the bankrupt, the courts reached different conclu-
sions as to the priority to be accorded the employer taxes. See note 58 infra.
60. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
61. In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1964); Lines v. California
Dep't of Employment, 242 F.2d 201 (9th Cir. 1957); United States v. Fogarty, 164 F.2d
26 (8th Cir. 1947) (first priority); In re Miller Ready Mix Koncrete Corp., 358 F. Supp.
401 (D. Utah 1972) (fourth priority).
62. See Lines v. California Dep't of Employment, 242 F.2d at 203.
63. If the tax were on the distribution of the wage claim, the tax could be a
valid expense of administration since distribution is part of administration; but
the tax in question is not a tax on distribution, but a tax on wages paid.
Note, 56 MICH. L. REv. 631, 632 (1958).
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ing taxes, the dollar amount of the wage claims. The liability for em-
ployer taxes, as in the case of withholding taxes, attaches only at the
time of actual payment of the claims. Therefore, it would be inconsist-
ent to pay employer taxes ahead of the wage claims which give rise to
the duty to pay these taxes. If assets of the bankrupt estate were suffi-
cient to pay only the first priority claims, allowing employer taxes a first
priority would result in the payment of the tax, even though the wage
claim on which it is based would never be paid. In addition, it is difficult
to characterize employer taxes within the scope of first priority as neces-
sary "costs or expenses of preserving the estate."
Federal courts have granted employer taxes a fourth priority status
upon the theory that Congressional intent was to grant tax claims a
priority above general creditors." However, it is clear that not all taxes
are entitled to this priority, but only those "legally due and owing by
the bankrupt." 5 When the trustee fits within the definition of employer
under the unemployment tax provisions, the tax would not be legally
due and owing by the bankrupt, but by the trustee. Thus unemployment
tax claims would not qualify for fourth priority status and would only
share pro rata with general creditors.
On the other hand, since there is no statutory definition of employer
for social security purposes, these tax claims might fit into the fourth
priority category by use of the "trustee steps into the shoes of the bank-
rupt" rationale. This would allow employer social security taxes to be
paid as a fourth priority claim, as due and owing by the bankrupt. Even
this approach presents some problems. Payment of employer taxes as a
fourth priority claim would mean that if funds were not available to pay
all claims within this priority, social security taxes would be diverted
to payment of other federal, state and local taxes. In addition, the ra-
tionale used to accord employer taxes a fourth priority is indeed
strained. It provides the inconsistent result of allowing employer social
security taxes fourth priority, while relegating unemployment taxes to
the status of general unsecured claims. It is apparent that fourth priority
does not provide an entirely adequate solution for employer taxes.
Likewise, second priority status for the employer's portion of social
security taxes and unemployment taxes cannot logically be advanced.
Unlike the withholding taxes in Otte, employer taxes are not carved out
of gross wages. Even though it might be argued that an employer pays
64. "By establishing a fourth priority dealing specifically with taxes, Congress appar-
ently intended to express a general preference for tax claims over claims of general, non-
priority creditors." In re Miller Ready Mix Koncrete Corp., 358 F. Supp. at 405.
65. Bankruptcy Act §64(a)(4).
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unemployment taxes and social security taxes so that the employees will
ultimately be able to obtain unemployment or retirement benefits, it is
unlikely employer tax contributions would be characterized as wages in
light of Supreme Court decisions" delineating the scope of wages under
section 64(a).17 The Supreme Court has ruled that employer contribu-
tions do not possess the "customary attributes of wages"" since they are
not paid to the employees. Another reason for disallowing employer
contributions the status of wages is that the amount available to pay
the wage claimants would be reduced, since all claims within this class
share on a pro rata basis. The Supreme Court reasoned that this would
conflict with the intent behind allowing wages a second priority status,
which is to alleviate in some degree the hardship on employees caused
by sudden unemployment due to the employer's bankruptcy." Applying
this analysis to employer taxes would result in these taxes being denied
classification as wages under section 64(a), even though the employer
might view these taxes as part of his total cost of employment. There-
fore, employer taxes would not be entitled to second priority.
It is difficult to find a rationale for allowing employer taxes any prior-
ity"' whatsoever under the current Bankruptcy Act. Only fourth priority
can logically be maintained, yet even this approach provides inconsist-
ent and perplexing results. Strained rationales do not fulfill the need to
66. In United States v. Embassy Rest., Inc., 359 U.S. 29 (1959), the Supreme Court
denied second priority status to employer contributions for employee life insurance and
health care benefits. Similarly, employer contributions to a non-participating annuity
plan were not entitled to the status of wages in Joint Indus. Bd. of Elec. Indus. v. United
States, 391 U.S. 224 (1968).
67. The Bankruptcy Act does not define the term "wages." Therefore, what is included
within the scope of wages has been a matter of considerable debate. See Note, The Wage
Priority Issue: Formula for Consensus, 68 IND. L.J. 66 (1968); Note, Employee Fringe
Benefits in Employer Bankruptcy, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 604 (1974). See also Report of the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971). Part I of that report contains a general explanation, while Part II contains
legislative proposals, including the Proposed Bankruptcy Act [hereinafter cited Proposed
Bankruptcy Acti. Section 4-405(a)(4) and Note 4 of the Act would specifically overrule
United States v. Embassy Rest., Inc., 359 U.S. 29 (1959), and Joint Indus. Bd. of Elec.
Indus. v. United States, 391 U.S. 224 (1968), and allow fringe benefits a priority behind
wages. The Proposed Bankruptcy Act also specifically provides for employer taxes on
prebankruptcy wages. Thus, employer taxes would not fall under the category of fringe
benefits under the Proposed Bankruptcy Act. See notes 73-77 and accompanying text
infra.
68. United States v. Embassy Rest., Inc., 359 U.S. at 33.
69. Id. at 32.
70. See Armadillo Corp. v. United States, BNA DAILY TAX REPORT, No. 59, Mar. 25,
1976, at H-i, holding that employer taxes are not entitled to any priority, but must share
pro rata with general unsecured claims.
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provide employer taxes a priority status. The present Bankruptcy Act
provides no clear cut guidelines.
A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION: THE PROPOSED BANKRUPTcY ACT
The confusion surrounding employment taxes on second priority wage
claims centers around one fact; there is not a specific priority for em-
ployment taxes within the hierarchy of section 64(a). Congress has
amended section 64(a) many times, yet failed to clarify the status of
employment taxes." The problem has been left to the courts, resulting
in innovative opinions which attempt to place withholding and em-
ployer taxes into one of the existing priorities. Legislative change in the
structure of the priority system is needed, and only Congress has the
appropriate fact-gathering facilities to gauge the impact of such a policy
question.
Recognizing the need for reform, Congress created the Commission on
the Bankruptcy Act." The Commission has reported its recommenda-
tions,73 which include a restructuring of the present section 64(a). This
section would be replaced by section 4-405(a) of the Proposed Bank-
ruptcy Act. Under the proposed section 4-405(a), priorities pertinent to
this discussion and their order of payment include: (1) administrative
expenses. . . . (3) claims for wages; (4) claims for fringe benefits; and
(5) tax claims accruing within one year of the petition.74
Under this proposal, the trustee is expressly required to withhold
taxes from prebankruptcy wages, and withholding taxes are allowed the
71. Congress's failure to provide a priority for employment taxes would be less disturb-
ing if employment taxes were a relatively new concept. This is not the case. The Social
Security Act was approved in 1935, Act of August 14, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620. Federal
income tax withholding began in 1943 with the withholding of a "Victory Tax" from wage
and salary payments in that year. Act of Oct. 21, 1942, ch. 619, §465, 56 Stat. 884. In 1944
withholding was extended to the federal income tax itself. Act of June 9, 1943, ch. 120,
§1622, 57 Stat. 128. Congress has amended section 64(a) eight times since 1938; however,
none of these revisions have dealt with employment taxes. For the legislative history of
section 64(a), see generally 3A COLLIER 64.01.
72. S.J. Res. of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.
73. The Proposed Bankruptcy Act has been introduced in the 94th Congress, H.R. 31,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), as well as a proposed substitute bill drafted by the National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Both bills are
identical as far as the scope of proposed section 4-405 is concerned. Both are currently
before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights. H.R. 31,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
74. Proposed Bankruptcy Act §4-405(a). The tax priority no longer includes the wording
"legally due and owing by the bankrupt" which is currently found in section 64(a)(4) of
the Bankruptcy Act. In addition, the period for accrual of taxes has been shortened from
three years to one year.
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same priority as the personal earnings from which they are withheld.7
The Otte decision is thus in harmony with this proposal. The Commis-
sion's proposal also provides that employer taxes attributable to wages
earned prior to the petition, but paid afterwards from the estate, should
enjoy only the priority status of taxes, rather than the higher status
allowed by some of the federal courts."' The proposed priority structure
would result in employer taxes sharing pro rata with other state and
local taxes that fall into the tax priority."
The proposal is not without some drawbacks. The Supreme Court in
Otte noted that any one of the following parties might be classified as
the employer: the trustee, the referee, the estate, or the court.7" How-
ever, the Commission's proposal specifically mentions only the trustee. 9
Thus if the court is classified as the employer, the proposal provides no
guidance as to whether taxes should be withheld or the priority they are
to be allowed. The Proposed Act should provide a definition of employer
to clarify this situation. While this proposed solution may not be the
perfect answer, 0 it has the virtue of recognizing the distinction between
withholding and employer taxes and providing a separate rule for each
type of tax.
75. Proposed Bankruptcy Act §4-405(a)(5)(C) and Note 11 of the Act. One must look
both at the draft of the statute and the notes to determine that withholding taxes are
entitled to the same priority as wages. From the draft of the statute itself, withholding
taxes appear to be entitled to only a "tax priority." The notes indicate otherwise. The
status of withholding taxes should be clearly delineated in the statute itself.
76. Id.
77. Proposed Bankruptcy Act §4-405(b).
78. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
79. Proposed Bankruptcy Act §4-405(c).
80. The Treasury Department is opposed to the tax provisions of S. 236 recommended
by the Bankruptcy Commission for revision of the bankruptcy laws. Dale S. Collinson,
Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel for the Treasury, testified before the Subcommittee on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Committee on November 6,
1975 as follows:
We believe that the proposed priority and discharge provisions will have severe
adverse consequences for the Federal tax system. The collection of taxes in
bankruptcy proceedings would clearly be substantially reduced to unacceptable
levels ....
Testimony of Dale S. Collinson, Hearings on S. 236 Before the Subcomm. on Improve-
ments in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975). See also Statement of Donald C. Alexander, Hearings on S. 236 Before the Sub-
comm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Plumb, The Tax Recommendations of the Commission on
the Bankruptcy Laws-Priority and Dischargeability of Tax Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV.
991 (1974). But see D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, AND REFORM
41 (1971), where it is shown that amounts collected by the government due to priorities
are nominal.
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CONCLUSION
The Proposed Bankruptcy Act is only a suggested solution and has yet
to be enacted. At present, section 64(a) provides no clear cut priority in
which to place employment taxes under the Bankruptcy Act. Even
though the decision in Otte provided a rationale for according withhold-
ing taxes on prebankruptcy wages a second priority status within the
priority structure, a state of indecision and confusion still exists as to
the priority status of employer taxes. If a priority is to be accorded to
employment taxes, creditors should be able to know that priority will
be uniformly applied. This need for certainty is especially important
when there are not enough funds to pay all competing creditors. More
than 25 years elapsed before the Supreme Court finally resolved the
priority to be accorded withholding taxes. This piecemeal approach to
a solution might result in another 25 years of indecision regarding the
priority to be accorded employer taxes. With our nation currently expe-
riencing the largest number of bankruptcy filings in history, Congres-
sional action is needed."
Karen Kay Barnes
81. CCH Newsbureau Release of October 15, 1975 reports that total bankruptcy peti-
tions filed in fiscal year ended June, 1975 reached a record high of 254,484. The previous
high of 208,329 cases filed occurred in fiscal year 1967.
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